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Constitutional Aesthetics: Appending Amendments to
the United States Constitution
Mehrdad Payandeh
ABSTRACT

Ever since the First Federal Congress in 1789 adopted the Bill of
Rights, amendments to the United States Constitution have not been
interwoven with the original text but appended to it. An examination
of the historical background reveals that this decision of Congress was
based on a misconception of the nature of a constitution and of
constitutional rights in particular. It was furthermore motivated by the
opponents of the Bill of Rights who tried to diminish the meaning and
significance of the amendments. This somewhat arbitrary and
misinformed decision about constitutional design had a subtle but
significant influence on further constitutional developments: on the
practice of making amendments, on the symbolic nature of the
Constitution and the character of the Bill of Rights, and on
constitutional interpretation.
“Form, sir, is always of less importance than the substance;
but on this occasion, I admit that form is of some consequence.”
James Madison 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Constitutional amendments play a significant role in the narrative
of the history, law, and politics of the United States Constitution. The
Founding was characterized by the repudiation of the amendment
procedure under the Articles of Confederation in favor of the

Dr. iur., LL.M. (Yale), Senior Research Fellow, Heinrich-Heine-University of Duesseldorf. I
am grateful to Professors Akhil Reed Amar and Bruce Ackerman for their thoughtful comments
and valuable suggestions.
1. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 708 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE
DOCUMENTARY RECORD FROM THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 118 (Helen E. Veit, Kenneth R.
Bowling & Charlene Bangs Bickford eds., 1991) [hereinafter CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
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revolutionary approach of 1787. 2 Immediately after the Founding, the
formulation of the Bill of Rights as amendments to the Constitution
preoccupied the First Federal Congress. The Civil War resulted in the
Reconstruction Amendments, arguably the most important
transformation of U.S. constitutional law in the nineteenth century.
This importance of amendments for constitutional reality justifies the
enormous attention constitutional scholars pay to issues surrounding
the amendment procedure: did the Fourteenth Amendment enter into
force in a constitutional way, even though the Republican government
excluded the all-white southern governments from the process? 3 Is the
procedure of constitutional amendment under Article V of the U.S.
Constitution exclusive? 4 Or is it just one form of higher lawmaking
alongside a more informal process of constitutional moments?5
Scholars have comprehensively scrutinized the amendment procedure
as well as the content and scope of the single amendments.
Yet, one particular aspect of the amendment mechanism has
hardly attracted any attention among constitutional scholars: the fact
that amendments do not alter the original Constitution but are added to
the text in a supplementary form. Students of the U.S. Constitution
may be inclined to take this form of constitutional amending for
granted. All twenty-seven amendments to the Constitution have been
added to the original Constitution in this manner. The text of the
original Constitution has never been changed. It is the same text that
was adopted at the Philadelphia Convention on September 17, 1787,
and subsequently ratified by the state conventions; however, a casual
gaze at the practice of constitutional design around the world and
within the U.S. reveals that the Constitution’s mode of amendment is
rather exotic. Modern constitutions are regularly amended by changing
the text. New provisions are not adhered in chronological order but
interwoven with the text. A look at the constitutional history of the
2. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 29–33, 285–86
(2005); Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
475, 480 (1995).
3. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99–252 (1998)
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment did not come about in the process constitutionally
envisioned by Article V); AMAR, supra note 2, at 379 (arguing that the exclusion was justified
under the guarantee of a republican form of government according to Article IV, § 4 of the U.S.
Constitution); see also the counterplea by Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 1737, 1747 n.25 (2007).
4. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995) (arguing for
the exclusivity of the Article V amendment procedure); see also Thomas E. Baker, Towards a
“More Perfect Union”: Some Thoughts on Amending the Constitution, 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
1, 3 (2000); AMAR, supra note 2, at 295–99 (accepting the theoretical possibility of constitutional
amendments outside of Article V).
5. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266–94 (1991).
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United States confirms that the federal model did not come as a
necessary consequence. In fact, when James Madison proposed the
Bill of Rights to the First Federal Congress in June of 1789, he
propounded that the amendments be integrated into the original text of
the Constitution. 6
The historical background of the First Federal Congress’s decision
in favor of adding amendments in a supplementary form, and against
incorporating or interweaving them with the original text, is
documented only fragmentarily and only with regard to the
deliberations in the House of Representatives.7 Scholars have analyzed
this history and offered some tentative conclusions about the prevailing
conception of constitutionalism at the time of the First Congress. 8 In
addition, they have offered a draft of how the U.S. Constitution could
look today, had Madison prevailed. 9
Yet, an analysis of how the peculiar design of the amendment
technique has influenced subsequent constitutional developments and
our perception of the Constitution and of constitutional law in general
is missing until today. This article will attempt to fill in this gap in
constitutional scholarship and to examine in more detail the impact of
the First Congress’s decision in favor of the supplementary form of
amendments. Part II of this article is devoted to the historical question
of why Congress chose to append amendments to the Constitution and
not to interweave them with the text. Part III examines the influence
this decision had on the development of the Constitution.
II. THE 1789 DECISION OF THE FIRST CONGRESS
An inquiry into the significance of the supplementary style of
constitutional amendments has to begin with the debate between James
Madison and Connecticut Congressman Roger Sherman who, during
the First Congress in 1789, objected to Madison’s approach and
introduced the idea of adding amendments as an annex to the text of
the original Constitution. 10 The refusal of the Philadelphia Convention
6. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 11–14.
7. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 55–213; see also GEORGE
ANASTAPLO, THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION: A COMMENTARY 33 (1995).
8. See Price Marshall, Essay, “A Careless Written Letter” – Situating Amendments to
the Federal Constitution, 51 ARK. L. REV. 95, 96–112 (1998); Edward Hartnett, A “Uniform
and Entire” Constitution; Or, What if Madison had Won?, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 252–58
(1998); Carlos E. González, Representational Structures Through Which We the People Ratify
Constitutions: The Troubling Original Understanding of the Constitution’s Ratification Clauses,
38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1373, 1489–96 (2005); Jason Mazzone, Unamendments, 90 IOWA L.
REV. 1747, 1778–93 (2005).
9. See Hartnett, supra note 8, at 284–99.
10. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
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to include a bill of rights in the Constitution served as one of the
major obstacles in the ratification of the new Constitution and fueled
the Anti-Federalist opposition to the Constitution.11 The formulation of
fundamental individual rights against encroachment by the newly
formed federal government, therefore, was of pivotal importance at
the First Congress in the spring and summer of 1789. Debates about
the substance of the proposed amendments—proposals that eventually
came into being as the Bill of Rights—were accompanied by a debate
about the form of the amendments. While Madison initially proposed
the amendments to be integrated and interwoven into the text of the
original Constitution, Congress eventually decided to leave the text
untouched and append the amendments after Article VII. After the
first ten amendments came into existence in this supplementary form,
this technique has been applied to each of the seventeen subsequent
amendments. Congress’s decision in 1789, therefore, has set a
precedent in favor of the supplementary form of amendments, a
precedent that has not been challenged in constitutional practice or
academic writing.
On what basis, then, did the First Congress decide in favor of the
supplementary method of constitutional amendment? Scholars who
have explicitly dealt with this question have focused on the debate
between Madison and Sherman within the First Congress. 12 They have
emphasized that the decision in favor of Sherman’s approach of adding
the amendments constitutes a concession by Madison, who preferred
to interweave the amendments into the text of the Constitution, but
surrendered his preference in form for the sake of achieving a
consensus with regard to the substance of the amendments.13
According to this reading, the decision in favor of the Sherman
approach is conceived of as a political compromise. This is
undoubtedly true; however, if seen only in this way, a significant
characteristic of the 1789 decision is neglected almost completely—its
arbitrary nature. The arbitrariness of the decision in favor of the
supplementary form becomes clear if one adds to the picture four
hitherto neglected aspects. First, the lack of guidance and examples
that Congress could build its decision upon allowed for an open-ended
debate about the form of the amendments. Second, the somewhat
arbitrary nature of the decision is mirrored in the debate between
Sherman and Madison. A closer examination of the debate leads to the
note 1, at 117.
11. See John P. Kaminski, Restoring the Grand Security: The Debate over a Federal Bill
of Rights 1787-1792, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 887, 889–912 (1993).
12. See Hartnett, supra note 8, at 252–58; Marshall, supra note 8, at 96–112.
13. See id.
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result that Madison had the better arguments and that the approach of
Sherman and his supporters was based on a number of misconceptions
about the nature of the Constitution. Third, the substance of the
amendments that were debated as the first amendments to the
Constitution also played a decisive role in determining the form of the
amendments. Had the amendments proposed to the First Congress not
dealt with the rather autonomous matter of fundamental rights but with
a topic that had more explicitly required a change in the text of the
Constitution, the debate could have taken a different course. Fourth,
concerns regarding the practicability of incorporating amendments into
the text might also have played a role. These four aspects will be
examined in this section in order to highlight that the supplementary
form of the amendment process is not only based on an arbitrary
decision but also on a decision that was motivated by unpersuasive
arguments. The third part of this article will examine how this
arbitrary and unpersuasive decision has influenced the subsequent
development of constitutional law and our contemporary understanding
of the Constitution.

A. Congress on its Own: The Lack of Guidance and of Examples
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, if a state decides to
craft a new constitution, it can look for guidance not only to the
approximately 200 constitutions that are currently in force, but also to
a long history of failed and effective constitution-making. In 1787, by
contrast, the Philadelphia Convention could not resort to any such
compilation of experience. When the Founders looked for guidance in
constitutional design, their horizon probably encompassed the
constitutions of the thirteen newly independent states, the Articles of
Confederation, and the constitution of the Kingdom of Great Britain.
But while these documents and sets of written and unwritten
principles—along with the Declaration of Independence—gave some
guidance with regard to substance, they were of only limited value
with regard to the technique of amending. The Constitution of the
United Kingdom does not consist of a single written document but is a
set of documents and unwritten sources. 14 No formal mechanism of
amending the Constitution as a whole exists. The Articles of
Confederation arranged for the possibility of amendments but no
amendment ever came into force. 15 It is therefore pure speculation

14. See, e.g., HILAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 3 (5th ed.
2004).
15. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 2, at 285-86.
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whether amendments to the Articles would have been integrated in the
text or appended. 16
Just as state constitutions were of little help to the Philadelphia
Convention in 1787, they were again of little help to the Founders as
examples with regard to the amendment procedure as such, 17 nor to
the First Congress in 1789 with regard to the amendment technique.
The Constitution of Connecticut of 177618 continued the 1662 Charter
from the King of England, 19 just as Rhode Island continued to be
governed by the 1663 Charter from the King.20 Neither Charter
encompassed an amendment mechanism. Similarly, the constitutions of
New York, 21 Virginia, 22 and North Carolina 23 did not explicitly
provide for the possibility of amendment. And while the constitutions
of New York and North Carolina were subsequently amended, these
amendments occurred only after the meeting of the First Congress.24
The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 could be amended by the
legislature, though it also determined that some of its provisions could
not be amended. 25 In 1777, the New Jersey legislature amended the
Constitution substituting the words “State” and “States” for “colony”
and “colonies.” 26 The constitutions of South Carolina, 27 Delaware, 28
16. It is, however, worth noting that when Congress, in 1785, considered an amendment
to the Articles of Confederation, the Committee of the Whole submitted a proposition to alter the
text of Article 9, ¶ 1 of the Articles. 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).
17. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 287–89.
18. CONN. CONST. (1776), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 257 (Benjamin
Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter 1THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
19. CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT, reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 252.
20. CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS (1663), reprinted in 2
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES, 1595 (Benjamin Perley Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878) [hereinafter 2 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS].
21. N.Y. CONST. (1777), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 20, at 1328.
22. VA. CONST. (1776), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 20, at 1910.
23. N.C. CONST. (1776), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS supra
note 20, at 1409.
24. See N.Y. Amendments to the Constitution of 1777 (1801), reprinted in 2 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 20, at 1339; N.C. Amendments to the
Constitution of 1776 (1835 & 1854), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 20, at 1415.
25. N.J. CONST. art. XXIII (1776), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 20, at 1313.
26. See 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, Colonial Charters, supra note 20, at
1310.
27. S.C. CONST. art. XLIV (1778), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 20, at 1627.

87]

CONSTITUTIONAL AESTHETICS

93

Maryland, 29 and Pennsylvania 30 provided for their amendment, as did
the 1784 Constitution of New Hampshire,31 but none were ever
amended. Similarly, while Georgia’s Constitution of 1777 could be
amended, 32 as could its 1789 Constitution, 33 amendments were not
made before 1795. 34 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 35 was not
amended before 1822. 36 With the exception of New Jersey, which
amended its 1776 Constitution by substituting one expression, the
history of the state constitutions lacks any comprehensive or
instructive illustration of constitutional amendment design.
In light of the above, when the First Congress convened in 1789
to discuss amendments to the Constitution, it had only limited points
of reference with regard to the question of how to amend a
constitution. It was left with the text of Article V, which stipulates
that amendments that are proposed and ratified in the procedure laid
down in Article V “shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part
of this Constitution.”37 Article V neither specifies how the
amendments shall become part of the Constitution, nor does the term
“amendment” determine whether amendments should be annexed to or
integrated in the text. 38

B. Debating the Form of Amendments at the First Congress
In the absence of clear normative predeterminations, the delegates
to the First Congress were in the position to freely decide whether
they wanted to integrate amendments into the Constitution or add them
to the text. Madison assumed that amendments should be integrated

28. DEL. CONST. art. IX (1776), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 300.
29. MD. CONST. art. LIX (1776), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 828.
30. PA. CONST. § 47 (1776), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 20, at 1548.
31. N.H. CONST. pt. II, unenumerated paragraph (1784), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 20, at 1293.
32. GA. CONST. art. LXIII (1777), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 383.
33. GA. CONST. art. IV, § 7 (1789), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 387.
34. Ga. Amendments to the Constitution of 1789 (1795), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 387.
35. MASS. CONST. pt. II, ch. VI, art. X (1780), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 972.
36. Mass. Amendments to the Constitution of 1780 (1822), reprinted in 1 THE FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 18, at 973.
37. U.S. CONST. art. V.
38. Id.
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into the text of the Constitution; thus, he proposed that a declaration
recognizing popular sovereignty should be prefixed to the Constitution
and that other substantive changes—which in part would later become
the Bill of Rights—should be made through adding text into specific
articles and sections of the original Constitution.39 Madison’s proposal
was, however, not the only proposal that was on the table.
Amendment proposals made by the state conventions were rather
undecided as to the question of the amendment technique. The
proposals made by Massachusetts, 40 New Hampshire, 41 and Virginia 42
encompassed only substantive changes without further specifying how
these proposals should become part of the Constitution. The proposals
of South Carolina and New York basically followed this same
approach, yet they show that the legislatures of these states thought it
legitimate to make changes to the original text of the Constitution. 43
South Carolina proposed to insert a word in Article VI, Section 3, 44
and New York proposed that the phrase “without the Consent of the
Congress” be deleted from Article I, Section 9.45 Similarly, the House
Committee Report suggested making changes directly to the text of the
Constitution. 46

1. Sherman v. Madison
The form of the amendments was debated first in the Committee
of the Whole on August 13, 1789, and again in the House on August
19, 1789. 47 These debates followed sessions of the House in which the
representatives intensely discussed whether it was too early to adopt

39. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433–36 (1789) (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed., 1834) (recounting
Madison’s introduction of proposed Amendments to the Constitution), reprinted in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 11; see also Madison’s statements in the committee of the
whole described in GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES (June 10, 1789), reprinted in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 66; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 424–42 (1789), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 84–85.
40. Amendments proposed by the Massachusetts Convention (1788), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 14.
41. Amendments proposed by the New Hampshire Convention (1788), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 16.
42. Amendments proposed by the Virginia Convention (1788), reprinted in CREATING THE
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 17.
43. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 458–59.
44. Amendments proposed by the South Carolina Convention (1788), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 16.
45. Amendments proposed by the New York Convention (1788), reprinted in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 28.
46. HOUSE COMMITTEE REPORT (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 29.
47. CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 104, 197.
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amendments to the Constitution and whether the House, the
Committee of the Whole, or a select committee was the appropriate
forum to discuss amendments. 48 When the representatives eventually
decided to move into the Committee of the Whole,49 Madison
proposed an introductory paragraph that should precede the text of the
Constitution. 50 Sherman, who was generally opposed to discussing
amendments and a Bill of Rights,51 immediately objected to the
proposal and opted for appending the amendments to the text of the
original Constitution:
I believe, [M]r. Chairman, this is not the proper mode of amending
the [C]onstitution. We ought not to interweave our propositions into
the work itself, because it will be destructive of the whole fabric.
We might as well endeavor to mix brass, iron and clay, as to
incorporate such heterogeneous articles; the one contradictory to the
other. Its absurdity will be discovered by comparing it with a law:
would any legislature endeavor to introduce into a former act a
subsequent amendment, and let them stand so connected. When an
alteration is made in an act, it is done by way of supplement; the
latter act always repealing the former in every specified case of
52
difference.

This started a fierce debate about the right mode of amending the
Constitution. 53 Sherman and his supporters argued that Congress had
no authority to alter the original document itself, which was made
under the authority of the people. 54 Amendments, by contrast, would
not derive their authority from the people but from state
governments. 55 Under this view, any alteration of the original
48. See the debate taking place in May and June 1789 described in CREATING THE BILL
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 57–103.
49. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 660–64 (1789) (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed., 1834), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 102–03.
50. THE DAILY ADVERTISER (Aug. 14, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 104–05.
51. See, e.g., ANASTAPLO, supra note 7, at 15.
52. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 117.
53. This debate is described by three different commentators: see THE DAILY ADVERTISER
(Aug. 14, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 105–07; Gazette
of the United States (Aug. 15, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS , at 107–12; 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 703–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS , at 117–28.
Since the debate is described most comprehensively in The Congressional Register, I will, in the
following, primarily refer to this report.
54. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 117.
55. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 117, 125–26.
OF
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document would constitute a repeal to which Congress was not
authorized. 56 On the contrary, according to Sherman’s point of view,
Congress could only pass “legislative acts,” which therefore should be
detached from the Constitution and annexed. 57 The amendments,
therefore, should be kept clearly distinguishable from the original text
so that “by a comparison, the world would discover the perfection of
the original and the superfluity of the amendments.”58 Furthermore,
alterations of the document would render the signatures of those who
signed the document false and would obscure the fact that the
Founders had only signed the original Constitution. 59 Inserting
amendments in the body of a law was unprecedented, and universal
usage was to alter legal documents by supplementary acts. 60 The
Magna Carta, for example, had never been altered but only
supplemented by other documents. 61
Madison and his supporters, on the other hand, highlighted that
the simplicity of the Constitution would be destroyed through
supplementary amendments; incorporating the amendments would
guarantee that the Constitution would remain “uniform and entire.”62
Through supplementary amendments, the Constitution could, in time,
become too complex and obscure and thereby inaccessible to the
people. 63 Or, as Congressman John Vining described, the Constitution
could, “like a careless written letter, have more matter attached to it
in a postscript than was contained in the original composition.”64
Additionally, the supplementary method could lead to incoherencies in
situations when a clause in the original Constitution would be
inconsistent with an amendment.65 Incorporating amendments would
also avoid distorting the question of authority: the people themselves,
through the state conventions, had expressed their wish for
amendments. 66 Sherman’s proposal was problematic for supporters of
incorporated amendments because it assumed that amendments were
inferior to the original Constitution; such a proposition would defeat
56. Id. at 124.
57. THE DAILY ADVERTISER (Aug. 14, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 105.
58. 1ANNALS OF CONG. 707–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 120.
59. Id. at 120.
60. Id. at 119, 125.
61. Id. at 125.
62. Id. at 118.
63. Id. at 122, 123–24.
64. Id. at 120.
65. THE DAILY ADVERTISER (Aug. 14, 1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 106.
66. Id.
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the purpose of the amendments. 67 In addition, some supporters
referred to the text of Article V of the Constitution, which states that
the amendments should become part of the Constitution. 68 Therein,
they saw a decision of the Constitution in favor of incorporating
amendments. 69
At the end of the debate, the Committee of the Whole voted in
favor of Madison’s approach and decided that amendments should be
integrated in the text of the Constitution.70 In the following days, the
substance of the proposed amendments was debated in detail. On
August 19, 1789, however, Sherman repeated his motion for adding
the amendments rather than integrating them in the text of the original
Constitution. 71 This time his motion—which was proposed to the
House and not to the Committee of the Whole—passed. 72 The
Congressional Register only reports that a debate similar to the one on
August 13, 1789, took place but does not further describe its content
or offer any insights into why the House at this time decided against
Madison and in favor of Sherman. 73 The Senate, whose deliberations
were secret and are not reported, did not change this decision.
The most convincing explanation for the change of mind in the
House of Representatives lies in the increasingly tense atmosphere that
characterized the debates in the House and that even lead to
congressmen challenging each other to duels. 74 Against this
background, and against the background of some of the congressmen
generally opposing the adoption of amendments, the decision in favor
of Sherman has to be seen as a concession of Madison toward his
opponents. 75 Although Madison was strongly in favor of the
interweaving method as more than a mere preference of form, he had
already signaled to Sherman that he was willing to compromise on this
point. 76 This reading is supported by a letter from James Madison to
Alexander White:
67. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,

supra note 1, at 122, 127.

68. U.S. CONST. art. V.
69. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 118, 121–22.
70. Id. at 128.
71. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 766 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 197.
72. Id. at 197–98.
73. Id. at 198.
74. See Hartnett, supra note 8, at 256–58; CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1,
at xv.
75. See Marshall, supra note 8, at 110–12.
76. 1ANNALS OF CONG. 707–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 118.
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The substance of the report of the Committee of eleven has not been
much varied. It became an unavoidable sacrifice to a few who knew
their concurrence to be necessary, to the despatch [sic] if not the
success of the business, to give up the form by which the amendts.
[sic] when ratified would have fallen into the body of the
Constitution, in favor of the project of adding them by way of
77
appendix to it.

Thus, it appears clear that Madison gave up his preferred form of
amending in order to save the substance of the Bill of Rights, to
facilitate its adoption by Congress, and to improve its prospects for
success.

2. Assessment of the debate
It would be easy to treat the debate between Madison and Sherman
as any other political debate and to simply declare that Sherman
won—be it due to having the better arguments or due to the political
circumstances that led Madison to give in. However, a closer
examination of the arguments that Sherman and his supporters brought
forward reveals that they were informed by misconceptions about the
nature of the Constitution and of constitutional law. Moreover, from
the perspective of the twenty-first century, their goals in pursuing
appended amendments rather than incorporated ones have not been
achieved.

a. Heterogeneity. The first argument against interweaving the
amendments was the heterogeneity of the articles that would be
destructive “of the whole fabric” of the Constitution. This argument is
difficult to evaluate from the outset. The original Constitution
encompasses a variety of very heterogeneous provisions dealing with a
broad variety of issues. The main theme is of course the structure of
the new national government as well as the relationship to the states.
However, even within this homogeneous matter, the original
Constitution contains procedural as well as substantive regulations,
text of different degrees of generality, and dissimilar provisions
standing side-by-side, such as: the entrenchment of slave trade, 78 the
state of the Union address, 79 and the right to trial by jury.80 Against
77. Letter from James Madison to Alexander White (Aug. 24, 1789), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 287.
78. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
79. Id. art. II, § 3.
80. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.

87]

CONSTITUTIONAL AESTHETICS

99

this background, it is hard to see how the proposed amendments
would qualitatively change the homogeneity of the Constitution. As
individual rights and limits on the powers of the national government,
they fit in neatly with the original document, a document that as
Madison and Hamilton emphasized, was designed by the very
structure of the government it establishes as a guarantee of individual
rights. 81 Even if one agrees with Sherman’s perception of the
heterogeneity of the amendments, it would seem even more convincing
to integrate them into the text of the original Constitution in order to
clarify their relationship with the original text.

b. Unprecedented nature. Another argument brought against
interweaving the amendments into the text was that such a technique
would be unprecedented. Sherman referred to the general process of
lawmaking, in which a subsequent act would not alter the text of the
original act but be added as a supplement, specifying which parts of
the original act it repeals. 82 James Jackson from Georgia added the
example of the British Constitution in which the Magna Carta would
not be altered by an amendment. 83 The reference to the precedential
value of British constitutionalism is, however, not very convincing.
The creation of the American Constitution undoubtedly relied heavily
on the British tradition and incorporated numerous constitutional
elements, such as the habeas corpus provisions84 and the right to
trial. 85 At the same time, the Constitution incorporates numerous
elements that decisively depart from the British model and in fact
constitute an explicit repudiation of the governmental regime of the
former colonial power. The form of the Constitution in particular
constitutes a significant break with the tradition of British
constitutionalism. Unlike the unwritten British Constitution, Americans
chose to codify the basic rules and principles of their government in a
comprehensive and holistic, single, written document.86 Since the
British Constitution does not have an explicit mechanism for
amendment, it is hardly convincing to derive conclusions about the
technique of constitutional amendment from the British example.
81. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 65 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 581 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
82. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 117.
83. Id. at 125.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
85. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
86. On the nature of the British Constitution as a mainly unwritten document and on the
processes in which the British Constitution may be changed, see, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 14,
at 8–10.
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The reference to the general tradition of lawmaking is more
convincing. It would seem natural for the constitution makers to
imitate this example and to make “alterations” to the original
document by way of supplementary amendments. However, there are
some important differences between the Constitution and acts of
ordinary lawmaking that cast doubts on this analogy. Unlike legislative
statutes, the Constitution provides for the possibility of its own
amendment. 87 While statutes can be repealed and replaced at the will
of the legislature, the Constitution contains a special amendment
procedure, the task of which is to ensure that the people do not have
to replace the whole Constitution every time they want to change parts
of it. There are two ways in which the people can express their will:
through giving themselves a new constitution or through changing the
existing Constitution through amendments. 88 Unlike a statute which
can be repealed and replaced by the legislature at will, the
Constitution is designated to be the foundational document of the
Union government. This difference limits the immediate transferability
of the model of changing statutes to the constitutional amendment
process.
An inquiry into constitutional history further casts into doubt the
presumption of Sherman and his supporters as to the impossibility and
inappropriateness of interweaving amendments into the text of the
original Constitution. Already under the Articles of Confederation,
amendments had been proposed in a way that would have altered the
text of the Articles. 89 With regard to the adoption of a Bill of Rights
as a supplement to the Constitution, the amendment proposals brought
forward by the state conventions show that altering the text of the
Constitution was not as unthinkable as Sherman portrayed it. The
proposals of South Carolina and New York encompassed explicit
changes to the text of the original Constitution.90 There are no
indications that either of the two state conventions regarded this
technique as problematic. The same is true for Madison’s proposal.
While the congressmen at the First Congress could not foresee the
subsequent development, an examination of the practice of the state
constitutions 91 shows that the interweaving model is not as far-fetched
87. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
88. As to the exclusiveness of the Article V amendment procedure, see references, supra
notes 4 and 5.
89. See 1 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).
90. Amendments proposed by the South Carolina Convention (1788), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 16; Amendments proposed by the New York
Convention (1788), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 28.
91. Observations about the state constitutions in the following and throughout this paper
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as Sherman believed. Of the fifty state constitutions which are
currently in force, only the 1901 constitution of Alabama,92 the 1872
constitution of West Virginia, 93 and the Massachusetts Constitution of
1780, 94 follow the example of the federal Constitution and add
amendments to the text in supplementary form. 95 All other state
constitutions—many of which date back to the eighteenth or nineteenth
century—allow for alterations of and additions to the original text. 96
This background seriously challenges Sherman’s assumption with
regard to the extraordinary character of Madison’s interweaving
proposal.

c. Sources of authority. Turning to more substantive opposition
against interweaving amendments into the text, Sherman argued that
the Constitution and the amendments derived their authority from two
different sources and should therefore not be intermingled. This
argument touches upon the allegedly different nature of constitution
making and constitutional amendment. According to Sherman, the
former is an act of the people “at large,” whereas the latter, is only an
act of the state governments. 97 According to Sherman, the people had
authorized Congress only to make amendments, not to repeal the
Constitution. 98 Thus, Sherman would have perhaps referred to the
pivotal distinction in constitutional theory between the power that
creates the constitution (pouvoir constituant) and the power that is
created by and exercises powers derived from the constitution (pouvoir
constitué). Sherman’s assumption that the Constitution and the
amendments stem from two different sources of authority, however,
has to be criticized on the basis of constitutional practice and theory as
well as with regard to its internal coherence.
First, the Constitution came into force as the result of a proposal
are based on an examination of the fifty constitutions as they are presented on the official
websites of the state legislatures.
92. ALA. CONST. (1901).
93. W. VA. CONST. (1872).
94. MASS. CONST. (1780).
95. Furthermore, the constitutions of Alabama and Massachusetts differ from the federal
model. They add amendments to the original text in a manner resembling the federal
Constitution. Unlike the amendments of the federal Constitution, however, amendments under
the Alabama and Massachusetts constitutions can add text to or annul parts of the original
constitutions. The only instance in which the federal Constitution resembles this process is the
Twenty-First Amendment which explicitly repeals the Eighteenth Amendment.
96. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. (1938). The New York Constitution has been modified
numerous times since it entered into force, and it indicates after each article and section when a
certain provision had been altered by a constitutional amendment.
97. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 704 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 117, 125–26.
98. Id.
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by the Philadelphia Convention and the subsequent ratification by
conventions of at least nine states. 99 It has been pointed out that,
although the ratification did not occur through statewide referenda, the
participation of the people through the ratifying state conventions was
significantly more democratic than any process of constitution making
known before. 100 In contrast, amendments are regularly proposed by
Congress and ratified by state legislatures. Apart from the fact that
Article V also encompasses at least the theoretical possibility of
ratification by state conventions,101 the confrontation of “the people”
ratifying the Constitution as opposed to state legislatures ratifying the
amendments is too simplistic. The relationship between the people as
the bearer of popular sovereignty and state institutions as
representatives of the people is one of the most complex subjects of
democratic theory. Popular sovereignty is the main theme of American
constitutionalism, and it is among the pivotal achievements of the
American Founding. It is fair to say that the Constitution is regarded
as a foundational document establishing the government, and not as
the result of a bargaining process between the governed and the
governing. If one conceives of the American Constitution as a
contract, 102 it is a contract between the individuals and not between the
people and the governing entities;103 however, “the people” as an
entity are in need of modes of representation. Just as conventions are
a form of representation of the people,104 Congress and the state
legislatures are a different form of representation. One might argue
that state conventions are more democratic than Congress and state
legislatures, and that the former therefore represents the people more
accurately than the latter. This does not make the former an
embodiment of the people and the latter only a representative.
Borrowing the terminology employed by Bruce Ackerman:
representation of the people is never mimetic representation in which
the representative entity is to be equated with the people, but is only
symbolic representation, embracing the awareness that the
99. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
100. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 5 (1980); AMAR, supra note 2, at 7.
101. According to Article V, Congress can choose whether ratification shall occur through
the state legislatures or through state conventions. See U.S. CONST. art V.
102. Madison himself refers to the concept of a “social compact.” THE FEDERALIST NO.
44, at 301 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
103. See
CHRISTIAN WINTERHOFF, VERFASSUNG – VERFASSUNGGEBUNG –
VERFASSUNGSÄNDERUNG 17–19 (2007).
104. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787
306–343 (1969) (discussing the concept of conventions as representative assemblies outside of the
institutionalized framework of regularly constituted authorities); see also ACKERMAN, supra note
5, at 174–75 (arguing that the convention could speak for the people with “greater political
legitimacy” than any existing political institution).
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representative body is not the same as the entity it is supposed to
represent but only a representative in a symbolic way. 105 The original
Constitution, as well as the amendments to the Constitution, are
therefore creations of representatives of the people, and both derive
their ultimate legitimacy from the people as the bearer of popular
sovereignty.
Furthermore, while it might be true that at the end of the
eighteenth century the state conventions were more democratic than
the state legislatures, this argument loses its force with regard to
subsequent amendments. The Reconstruction Amendments as well as
most of the amendments of the twentieth century have led to an
extension of voting rights to groups that were previously excluded
from the political process: blacks, women, and eighteen-year-olds. 106
Similar developments took place on the state level. An amendment that
entered into force in the twentieth century or that will be decided upon
in the twenty-first century thereby derives its legitimacy from a
Congress and from state legislatures, which more accurately and
comprehensively represent the people than any other political
institution at any point in time before.
Second, and turning to the realm of constitutional theory, Sherman
implies that the amendments possess an inferior degree of authority
than the original Constitution.107 As a matter of constitutional theory,
the authority to make the constitution lies with the pouvoir constituant,
and the authority to change the constitution is vested in the pouvoir
constitué. 108 Whereas the act of constitution making constitutes a
genuine act of popular sovereignty, amendments to the constitution
derive their authority from the constitution itself and are therefore, a
legal act by an already constituted political power. While this
differentiation is essential in terms of constitutional theory, it does not
entail a lower degree of legal or political authority of the amendments.
At first sight, one might be tempted to argue in favor of a lower
authority of constitutional amendments in light of the farther reaching
powers of the pouvoir constituant in comparison to the pouvoir
constitué. While the former is legally unrestricted in exercising its
powers of constitution making, 109 the latter may exercise its
105. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 179–86.
106. See ELY, supra note 100, at 98–99.
107. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 707–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 117, 125–26.
108. This distinction was famously pronounced by EMMANUEL JOSEPH SIEYÈS, WHAT IS
THE THIRD ESTATE? (1964).
109. With regard to contemporary processes of constitution making, it may, however, not
be neglected that international law increasingly posits external legal influences on the constitution
making process. See, e.g., Philipp Dann & Zaid Al-Ali, The Internationalized Pouvoir
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amendment powers only within the procedures laid out by the
Constitution. The amendment powers can also be substantially
restricted by entrenched constitutional provisions that are kept from
the disposal of the amendment power. Under the U.S. Constitution,
the equal representation of the states within the Senate is not
amendable without the consent of every state, and, until 1808, the
slave trade clauses110 were exempted from the amendment process. 111
In the process of constitution making, the people as the pouvoir
constituant arguably are not subject to restrictions of this kind.
However, this difference in authority of the pouvoir constituant and
the pouvoir constitué does not entail a different authority of the
original Constitution and subsequent amendments. It does not endow
the original Constitution with a higher degree of normative force than
the amendments. The different degree of authority of the pouvoir
constituant and the pouvoir constitué applies to the original
Constitution and to the amendments in the same way: both are at the
disposition of the pouvoir constituant. As a matter of constitutional
theory, the people, at any point in time, have the power and capacity
to repeal the Constitution—the original Constitution and the
amendments alike—and to engage in an act of genuine constitution
making. Constitutional theory thereby does not imply a different
degree of authority between the original text of the Constitution and
the amendments.
This conclusion is furthermore supported by the text of the
Constitution. According to Article V, amendments “shall be valid to
all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution.”112 As a matter
of legal authority, the Constitution explicitly stipulates the equal status
of original Constitution and subsequent amendments. Original
Constitution and constitutional amendments are evenly part of the
“supreme Law of the Land.” 113 If the people express their will
through the act of constitution making, the U.S. Constitution exposes
the explicit will of the people that the amendments shall have the same
force and authority as the original Constitution.
Third, and finally, Sherman’s assumption that Congress has the
authority to amend but not to repeal the Constitution is not
maintainable in its generality. While Congress could not repeal the
Constitution as a whole, the amendment procedure allows Congress to
Constituant – Constitution-Making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor, 10
MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 423 (2006).
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 and cl. 4.
111. Id. art. V.
112. Id.
113. Id. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2.
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substantively repeal almost all parts of the Constitution. Under the
current Constitution, only the equal suffrage of each state in the
Senate is immune from amendment, unless every state consents. 114
The amendments, even though they are added to the original
Constitution and do not alter the text, substantively repeal parts of the
original Constitution. The Bill of Rights limits Congress’s power to
legislate, thereby altering its powers under Article I.115 Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment does not alter the text of the original
Constitution, but it substantively repeals parts of Article I, Section 2,
Clause 3. 116 The first section of the Seventeenth Amendment, which
stipulates that the Senators shall be elected by the people of the state,
repeals Article I, Section 3, Clause 1. The Twelfth, Twentieth and
Twenty-Fifth Amendments repeal and modify the procedure of
Presidential election and the President’s term of office in Article II,
Section 1. Congress’s power to amend the Constitution is not limited
to adding provisions but encompasses altering and repealing provisions
of the original Constitution. 117

d.

The need to distinguish.

Finally, the proponents of the
supplementary approach highlighted the need to maintain a clear
distinction between the text of the original Constitution and the
amendments. They wanted future generations to be able to compare
the original text with the amendments and thereby discover the
“superfluity” of the amendments.118 They deemed it improper to
interweave subsequent amendments into a text that was signed by the
Founding Fathers. 119 The latter objection is without merit. As New
York Congressman Egbert Benson rightly pointed out, Madison’s
approach would not have led to an actual change of the original
Constitution, which would remain untouched in the archives of the
United States. 120 It would at any time be visible—or at least traceable
114. Id. art. V. On the question of natural rights limitations of the amendment process, see
Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 YALE L. J. 1073, 1084–89
(1991).
115. U.S. CONST. art. I.
116. Id.
117. The same thought is expressed by Massachusetts Congressman Elbridge Gerry. See 1
ANNALS OF CONG. 712 (1789) (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed., 1834), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL
OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 122 (“It is said, if the amendments are incorporated it will be a
virtual repeal of the Constitution. I say the effect will be the same in a supplementary way,
consequently the objection goes for nothing, or it goes against making any amendments
whatever.”).
118. 1ANNALS OF CONG. 707–17 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 120.
119. Id. at 120.
120. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 713 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 123.
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through a view into the records of Congress—which formulations were
part of the original text and which alterations were made at which
point in time. Contemporary copies of the Constitution in effect could
highlight, for example through footnotes or an accompanying
explanatory commentary, how and when the text had been changed.
The Founding Fathers signed the Constitution with the text of Article
V in it. They were undoubtedly aware of the possibility of subsequent
alterations to the text and reasonably expected such alterations to
occur.
The assumption that amendments should be clearly distinguishable
from the original Constitution in order to prove the “superfluity” of
the amendments indicates that Sherman and his supporters did not only
care about the “right” way to make amendments in terms of juridical
handcraft. Their proposal was primarily motivated by their opposition
against including a Bill of Rights in the Constitution, as Philadelphia
Congressman George Clymer’s remark with regard to the superfluity
of the amendments clearly shows. 121 More than 200 years of
constitutional developments have proven Sherman and his supporters
wrong and placed the Bill of Rights—especially in correlation with the
subsequent Reconstruction Amendments—at the top of the
contemporary constitutional canon. The role the supplementary form
of the amendments might have played in the track record of the Bill of
Rights will be examined in Part III.

C. The Connection Between Substance and Form of the First
Amendments
Another aspect that might have influenced the outcome of the
debate between Madison and Sherman is the content of the actual
amendments that were debated at the First Congress. Among the main
purposes of the Congress was the formulation of fundamental rights
against encroachment by the federal government. To be sure, other
provisions were also discussed at the First Congress, and the twelve
amendments to the Constitution that were eventually adopted by
Congress on September 28, 1789, included not only the Bill of Rights
but also two provisions on the ratio of representation in the House of
Representatives and on the compensation of the members of Congress
respectively. 122 However, at the center of the debates were the
121. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 710 (1789), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 120.
122. Amendments to the Constitution art. I and II (Sep. 28, 1789), reprinted in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 3. Both Amendments initially failed to achieve the
required number of ratifications by the state legislatures, therefore turning Articles III to XII of
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individual rights now guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.
This substance matter of the proposed amendments might have
played into the hands of Sherman and his supporters. Even though the
Bill of Rights has been characterized as “more episodic and thus less
obviously coherent in character” than the text of the 1789
Constitution, 123 the ten amendments—with the exception of the Tenth
Amendment— were understood as embracing the same idea and
thereby building a unity.124 It was therefore easily conceivable that the
amendments could be annexed to the Constitution, with the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights as two separate but connected texts.
Although the reports of the First Congress do not encompass any hints
in this direction, the Congressmen could even resort to a precedent for
such a technique: in 1776 the state of Virginia adopted a Bill of
Rights 125 and, in a separate document, a constitution. 126 Going back in
time even further, Congress could draw upon the constitutional history
of Britain in which the Magna Carta of 1215, the Petition of Right of
1628, the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act, and the Bill of Rights of 1689
provided numerous examples of individual rights guarantees united in
a single document. 127
The Bill of Rights was therefore a thankful candidate to be added
to the Constitution in the form of an annex. It contained a certain
degree of coherence and unity. Congress could rely on precedents of
similarly designed rights declarations. Although the Bill of Rights
affects the original Constitution, it does not explicitly change any
provision of the original text. 128 While the first ten amendments could
have been interwoven into the text—as Madison’s proposal shows 129—
it did not seem as necessary and natural as it would have seemed, had

Congress’s Amendments into the Bill of Rights that became the first ten amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. The second of the two initially proposed articles has been ratified in 1992 and is
now in force as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment. See generally Richard B. Bernstein, The
Sleeper Wakes: The History and Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 497 (1992).
123. ANASTAPLO, supra note 7, at 34.
124. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131,
1132 (1991).
125. VA. BILL OF RIGHTS (1776), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 20, at 1908.
126. VA. CONST. (1776), reprinted in 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 20, at 1910.
127. See ANASTAPLO, supra note 7, at 22–28.
128. See Robert A. Goldwin, Congressman Madison Proposes Amendments to the
Constitution, reprinted in THE FRAMERS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 57, 62 (Robert A. Licht
ed., 1991) (“All of the ratified articles were additions, not amendments.”).
129. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433–36 (1789) (Joseph Gales, Sr., ed. 1834) (recounting
Madison’s introduction of proposed Amendments to the Constitution), reprinted in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 11; see also Hartnett, supra note 8, at 258–64.
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the First Congress discussed amendments which would have required
an explicit repeal or alteration of the original Constitution. Had the
First Congress, for example, discussed a change to the election
process of the Senate, which—as the Seventeenth Amendment does
now—demanded a change of Article I, Section 3, Clause 1, it would
have been more obvious to alter the provision in the article of the
original Constitution than to formulate such a change in a
supplementary amendment. When the New Jersey legislature in 1777
decided to amend the New Jersey Constitution of 1776 by substituting
the word “State” for “colony,” 130 it probably seemed natural to the
representatives to alter the term throughout the document instead of
formulating a single amendment stating that henceforth the term
“colony” should be read as “state.” Had the First Congress been
faced with a similar change to the Constitution, it might have
intuitively followed the New Jersey example.

D. Practical Problems
From the perspective of the twenty-first century, the amendment
of a legal document does not pose significant challenges with regard to
the practical and technological implementation. Legal texts are
officially published and reliably distributed. It is seldom problematic
to identify the law currently in force. Online publications furthermore
facilitate this process. By contrast, at the end of the eighteenth
century, practical obstacles in the amendment of a legal text might
have played a more dominant role. If amendments were integrated into
the text of the Constitution, every amendment would have required the
publication of a completely new text. Not only the higher costs of this
manner of production might have played a role, but also the fear of
numerous different versions of the Constitution circulating with the
difficulty of identifying the currently valid version. If the text of the
original Constitution was not changed, the already circulating versions
of the Constitution would remain valid. Only the newly established
amendments would have needed to be published and circulated.

E. Conclusion
The decision of the First Congress to add amendments to the
original text of the Constitution instead of integrating them into the
text has been influenced by a variety of factors. A lack of precedents

130. 2 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, Colonial Charters, supra note 20, at
1310.
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allowed Congress to freely debate the amendment technique. The
debate between Madison and Sherman reveals that the proponents of
the supplementary form did not only have the less persuasive
arguments but were also misinformed as to the nature of the
Constitution and the significance of the Bill of Rights. Turning more
to the realm of speculation, the substance of the amendments discussed
by the First Congress, as well as practical concerns about the
implementation of Madison’s approach, might have also facilitated
support for Sherman’s proposal. In conclusion, the decision of the
First Congress to add amendments to the Constitution in a
supplementary form seems, to a certain degree, arbitrary. It was not
only misinformed, but its decision was the result of a political bargain
between proponents and opponents of the Bill of Rights, with the latter
trying to diminish the meaning of the amendments. The opponents
were motivated by their opposition against the Bill of Rights and also
by their concern with and respect for the original Constitution. 131 With
these peculiarities of the amendment technique in mind, we can now
turn to the question of whether and how the decision in favor of
Sherman’s approach has influenced subsequent constitutional
developments.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
The somewhat arbitrary nature of the decision in favor of
appending amendments to the Constitution rather than integrating them
could be disregarded as a neat peculiarity of constitutional history if it
was simply a question of form. Yet, as Madison rightly pointed out in
1789, “on this occasion . . . form is of some consequence.” 132
Similarly, his opponent Sherman insisted that they were not only
debating a question of form. 133 But what exactly are the consequences
of the form that was chosen by the First Congress? In the following, I
will examine the impact of the supplementary mode of constitutional
amendment (A) on the practice of constitutional amendment, (B) on
the symbolic nature of the Constitution, and (C) on the character of
the Bill of Rights. Eventually, I will analyze (D) whether the
amendment technique has any significance for the interpretation of the
amendments and (E) for our understanding of the significant turning
points of constitutional history.

131. See Marshall, supra note 8, at 101.
132. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 708 (1789) (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed., 1834), reprinted in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 118.
133. Id. at 715.
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A. Probability and Significance of Constitutional Amendments
As pointed out in the Introduction, constitutional amendments play
an important role in American constitutional law. However, this is
only half the truth considering the remarkably small number of
successful amendments. While the Bill of Rights and the
Reconstruction
Amendments
constitute
major
constitutional
achievements of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, other major
events and developments of constitutional dimension have not been
formally translated into constitutional amendments. During the radical
changes encompassed by the New Deal Revolution, proposals for
amendments did not play a significant role. 134 The Civil Rights
Revolution of the 1960s did not culminate into a formal change of the
Constitution. 135 The Equal Rights Amendment was proposed by
Congress but did not achieve the required ratification by three-fourths
of the states. 136 In the current debate about same-sex marriage,
constitutional amendments mainly play a role as constitutional bans on
same-sex marriage, as they exist in numerous state constitutions and
were proposed on the national level through the Federal Marriage
Amendment. 137
The shrinking significance of formal amendments to the
Constitution has led constitutional scholars and practitioners to search
for alternative ways of transforming social change into constitutional
law. Bruce Ackerman, most famously argues for the recognition of the
New Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution as constitutional moments
on equal footing with the Founding and Reconstruction.138 As a
consequence, Ackerman argues that the constitutional canon should be
expanded to encompass not only the written text of the Constitution
but also landmark cases, such as Brown v. Board of Education, 139 and
superstatutes, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 140 Reva Siegel
highlights how even the failed Equal Rights Amendment has
influenced the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence under the Fourteenth
134. See ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 312–44.
135. However, the Twenty-Third to Twenty-Sixth Amendments, enacted between 1961 and
1971, expanded the scope of voting rights and aimed at precluding restrictions on the right to
vote. U.S. CONST. amends. XXIII-XXVI.
136. The proposed Equal Rights Amendment reads as follows: “Section 1. Equality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex. Section. 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article. Section. 3. This amendment shall take effect two years
after the date of ratification.” 86 Stat. 1523 (1972).
137. H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003).
138. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 58–80; Ackerman counterplea, supra note 3, at 1737.
139. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
140. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968).
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Amendment, taking into account the role of social movements in
influencing constitutional interpretation.141 At the beginning of the
twenty-first century, social and political movements try to bring about
constitutional change through strategic court appointees and changes in
the interpretation of the Constitution. The formal amendment process
plays only a subordinate role.
The connection between the formal requirements for an
amendment and the low number of amendments is obvious. The high
watermark of achieving a two-thirds majority in both houses of
Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the states 142 has only
seldom been achieved. But the supplementary design of the
amendments might also have had an influence on the practice and
politics of constitutional amendments. Akhil Amar has pointed out that
the supplementary form of the amendments demonstrates the
“incompleteness” of the Constitution and shows the American
Constitution as a “work in progress.” 143 The “vast creative white
space at the bottom” of the document thereby signals room for further
amendments. 144 This theoretically compelling understanding of the
amendment design is, however, rather harshly contrasted by the reality
of the very low number of successful amendments. While the
amendment design is certainly not among the most significant factors
explaining the low-key use of the amendment mechanism, it might
nevertheless have contributed to it. Constitutions that do not follow the
American model, but allow for alterations of the text itself, experience
amendments of different importance. While some amendments entail
significant substantial changes in constitutional law, other changes are
of a more cosmetic nature or have a clarifying meaning.145 In federal
systems, constitutions regularly encompass catalogues of competences
that are vested in either the federal or the state level. 146 Constitutional
orders that allow for alterations of the text enable the political actors
to more easily shift competences between the different federal
levels. 147 Under the U.S. Constitution, by contrast, such clarifying
141. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
142. U.S. CONST. art. V.
143. AMAR, supra note 2, at 460.
144. Id.
145. Under the German Constitution of 1949 (“German Basic Law”), for example, Article
I § 3 stipulates that the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution shall bind the legislature, the
executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law. In its original version the article limited
the executive to the administration (Verwaltung). In 1956 a constitutional amendment changed
the text to the broader term “executive power” (vollziehende Gewalt).
146. See, e.g., Articles 73, 74, and 75 of the German Basic Law, granting legislative
powers to the federal level (Bund) and to the states (Länder).
147. In 2006, for example, the German Basic Law was reorganized with regard to the
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changes and alterations in specific powers are more difficult. While
the Sixteenth Amendment 148 arguably had a clarifying function with
regard to Article I, Section 9, Paragraph 4, 149 no amendment has
touched upon the competences of Congress under Article I, Section 8.
This is even more remarkable considering that the distribution of
powers between the federal and the state level is among the most
controversial topics of American constitutional law. But no amendment
aims at clarifying the term “Commerce” in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 3 of the Constitution or the contentious scope of the
enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This is, of course, mainly due to the fact that it is difficult to achieve
the necessary political consensus required by Article V of the
Constitution. But as a complementary factor, it seems more difficult to
incorporate such changes in an isolated amendment than it would be to
propose an alteration of the text. It would have been relatively easy to
add the words “and to print paper money” to the power of Congress
to coin money under Article I, Section 8, Clause 5;but as a separate
amendment clarifying that Congress’s power to coin money includes
the issuance of paper money seems more difficult to achieve
politically. Opponents might argue that it would be inappropriate to
“waste” a whole amendment on such an issue.
Whether the supplementary form of the amendments actually had
such a decelerating effect on the practice of constitutional amendments
is hard to examine empirically. Numerous factors contribute to the
limited practical importance of the Article V procedure; among them,
are the high requirements for constitutional amendments and the
political landscape that is dominated by two ideologically dichotomic
political parties. In this light, a comparison with the constitutions of
other countries would not be conclusive. The comparably limited
number of successful amendments is primarily due to the fact that the
U.S. Constitution is among the constitutions with the most difficult
amendment procedure. 150 And even an examination of the state
constitutions is not very insightful and does not reveal a connection
between the mode of amendment and the number of successful
amendments. Currently, only the state constitutions of Alabama, West
allocation of legislative competences between the Bund and the Länder, see Gesetz zur Änderung
des Grundgesetzes (Act Amending the Basic Law), Aug. 28, 2006, BGBl. I at 2034 (F.R.G.).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and
without regard to any census or enumeration.”).
149. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. (“No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”).
150. See, e.g., Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88
AMERICAN POL. SCI. REV. 355, 362 (1994).

87]

CONSTITUTIONAL AESTHETICS

113

Virginia, and Massachusetts follow the model of the federal
Constitution. 151 Taking into account the duration of the constitutions,
West Virginia and Massachusetts are among the state constitutions that
have been amended the least. 152 Alabama, on the other hand, is the
state constitution with the highest rate of amendments. As of today,
827 amendments have been added to the original 1901 Constitution of
Alabama—18 of which deal with the operation of the game “Bingo” in
the different counties of Alabama.153 The mere fact that a constitution
follows the supplementary model therefore does not entail a low
number of amendments. However, Alabama might be a bad example
for a comparison with the federal Constitution. The Alabama
Constitution, even in its original form of 1901, is the longest state
constitution. It consists of 287 sections and regulates in great detail
matters that, at least from the perspective of the federal Constitution,
do not seem to belong to constitutional law substantively. The
examples of the state constitutions may in general be of no guidance
for understanding the amendment process of the federal Constitution:
unlike the federal Constitution, state constitutions are relatively “easy
to amend” and they are more often amended. 154
Nevertheless, the example of Alabama may show why federal
legislators may be reluctant to add too many amendments to the
federal Constitution. A federal Constitution with several hundred
amendments would no longer be a concise document accessible to the
people as the Founding Fathers wanted it to be. It would become the
“careless written letter” Congressman Vining feared.155

B. The Symbolic Dimension of the Constitution
This leads over to the question of the influence of the amendment
technique on the symbolic dimension and nature of the Constitution. 156
A constitution is the legal foundation of a national polity. It
establishes, legitimates, and limits public power. But beyond its legal
significance, a constitution ideally also has a symbolic function and is
a document with which the people can identify. In this regard, the
supplementary mode of constitutional amendment may be a virtue. It

151. See supra notes 92 to 95 and accompanying text.
152. See the data provided by Lutz, supra note 150, at 367.
153. ALA. CONST. (1901).
154. See Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 676 (2002).
155. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 710 (1789) (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed., 1834), reprinted in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 120.
156. See Marshall, supra note 8, at 97 (“The debate over the form of amendments was first
a debate over the nature of a constitution.”)
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unfolds the historical context of the original Constitution and of the
single amendments. Furthermore, it openly acknowledges the
imperfectness of the original Constitution and past mistakes of
American history. 157 The reader can become aware of the
achievements of the Founding moment, of the shortcomings of past
generations, as well as of the democratic accomplishments of
subsequent decades.
While it is true that the supplementary amendment technique may
have this effect, a similar result is regularly achieved by modern
constitutions through the preamble. The preamble of a constitution
establishes and highlights the historical context and background in
which the constitution came into being. Against the background of
World War II, the preamble of the 1949 Basic Law for the Federal
Republic of Germany, for example, highlights the German people’s
responsibility before God and man, their determination to promote
world peace, and their position as an equal partner in a united
Europe. 158 It also encompassed a reference to the separation of
Germany into West and East, a reference that was replaced after reunification by a reference to the unity and free self-determination of
the German people in 1990. 159 The preamble of the 1996 Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa begins with a reference to the
injustices of the past, and emphasizes that the Constitution is deemed
to “heal the divisions of the past” and “build a united and democratic
South Africa.” 160 South Africa’s history of apartheid is thereby clearly
visible in the preamble of its Constitution.
Embedding references to historical background—whether they are
positive, as the American Founding or German reunification, or
negative, as slavery, the abhorrence of the Second World War, or
apartheid—in the preamble, rather than in the operative part of a
constitution, may have further advantages. First, it may make the
context clearer. While the original U.S. Constitution encompasses
substantial references to slavery, it avoids the term slavery. Rather, it
contrasts slaves with free Persons and speaks of “all other
Persons,” 161 of the “migration or importation of Persons,”162 or of

157. AMAR, supra note 2, at 460–61; see also Hartnett, supra note 8, at 264 (highlighting
that the virtue of Madison’s approach would be to permit the elimination of “noxious
provisions”).
158. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, pmbl. (23 May 1949).
159. BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, pmbl. (as amended on 23
September 1990).
160. S. AFR. CONST., pmbl. (1996).
161. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (amended 1868).
162. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. (amended 1913).
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“Person[s] held to Service or Labour.” 163 As a result, constitutional
scholarship regularly does not focus much on the relationship between
slavery and the Constitution. Similarly, the inattentive reader may
simply skip these passages without seeing its implications for slavery.
The Reconstruction Amendments, of course, employ a much clearer
language. However, applying Madison’s approach, a clearer reference
to the abolishment of slavery could have been placed at a more pivotal
place in the preamble.
Madison’s approach would have had another advantage over the
supplementary mode of amending. Substantive parts of today’s
Constitution—especially the provisions concerning the Electoral
College and suffrage—are scattered all over the Constitution and the
amendments, making it difficult to identify the valid constitutional
rules. A reader who is not familiar with constitutional law might be
deeply confused when, after having read Article II, Section 1, Clause
3, he reaches the Twelfth Amendment. Similarly, if he wants to find
out who is eligible to vote, he will have to complement his reading of
the first Articles with the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth,
and arguably the Twenty-Fourth Amendments. Having all these
provisions bundled together would more immediately give the reader
an actual impression of the people’s participation in the political
process. In order for the people to identify with their Constitution, it
is not only necessary that the document reminds them of their place in
history and the achievements of the past, but it is of at least equal
importance that the document is accessible and intelligible and can be
understood even by readers not familiar with constitutional law.

C. The Character of the Bill of Rights
Constitutional provisions for the protection of individual rights
were already proposed during the Philadelphia Convention of 1787,
but no comprehensive bill of rights was agreed upon. 164 Opponents
argued that the constitutional protection of individual rights was not
necessary because the federal government did not have the power to
infringe rights in the first place, and substantive differences between
the state constitutions prevented consensus with regard to the
formulation of rights, for example the right to trial by jury in civil
cases. 165 The original Constitution encompasses only some specific
individual rights, such as the right to trial by jury in criminal cases,166
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. (amended 1865).
Kaminski, supra note 11, at 889–90.
ANASTAPLO, supra note 7, at 11–18.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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or the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 167 Following the
Philadelphia Convention, the lack of a constitutional catalogue of
rights proved to be a potential obstacle to the ratification process. 168
As a reaction, Alexander Hamilton argued in The Federalist No. 84
that many state constitutions also did not contain catalogues of
individual rights, and that the Constitution already encompassed
numerous rights protections. 169 Rights would only be necessary as
safeguards of subjects towards their king. Because the Constitution
established a government of the people by the people, such a
safeguard was not necessary. 170 The Founders were also skeptical as
to the effectiveness of individual rights protections because the
declarations of rights encompassed by some state constitutions had not
prevented the state legislatures from violating private rights. 171
Finally, adding individual rights might not only be superfluous but
also dangerous because it might be understood as stipulating
exceptions to powers which are not granted to the national
government. 172
Regardless of Hamilton’s remarks, many state conventions ratified
the Constitution only with the understanding that a bill of rights would
soon be established. 173 Many state conventions even submitted their
own proposals. Madison himself had promised his constituency in
Virginia to introduce a proposal.174 Nevertheless, the debate about the
desirability of a bill of rights continued in the First Congress. 175
Against this background, Sherman’s proposal to add the amendments
to the original Constitution in the way of an annex has to be seen as
an attempt of the Bill of Rights’ opponents to downplay the
importance of the amendments. The amendments were not supposed to
share the high authority of the original Constitution and should be
clearly distinguishable from the latter in order to make their alleged
superfluity visible.
Sherman and his supporters succeeded in having the amendments
annexed to the Constitution, but their project to undermine the
significance of the Bill of Rights failed. Although it was not until the
twentieth century that the full potential of the Bill of Rights started to
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
2006).
174.
175.

Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
See Kaminski, supra note 11, at 893–912.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 81, at 575–78 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id. at 578–79.
See Marshall, supra note 8, at 106.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 81, at 579 (Alexander Hamilton).
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 12 (3d ed.

See ANASTAPLO, supra note 7, at 36.
See Kaminski, supra note 11, at 913–20.
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unfold, particularly in its application against the states through
incorporation by the Fourteenth Amendment, 176 there is no doubt that
the amendments enjoy the same normative status as the original
Constitution. Moreover, their alleged superfluity in comparison with
the original Constitution has yet to be realized.
How has the decision in favor of the supplementary mode of
constitutional amendment influenced the development and perception
of the Bill of Rights? If Madison had prevailed, most parts of today’s
Bill of Rights would have been inserted in Article I, Section 9 as
limits on Congress and in Article III as safeguards in judicial
proceedings. 177 The substance of the first ten amendments would have
been kept but they would not have come along in the form of a neat
Decalogue. The symbolic dimension that is encompassed by the Bill of
Rights in their collectivity would be diminished. The people could not
as easily identify with single rights provisions spread across the seven
articles of the Constitution as they can with reference to the Bill of
Rights, as a more or less comprehensive collection of fundamental
rights guarantees. 178
Having constitutional rights bundled together in the
“interconnected package” 179 of ten amendments rather than spread
throughout the Constitution should also have eased the development of
a coherent general doctrine of fundamental rights. Modern
constitutions usually consist of two components: a catalogue of
fundamental rights and structural provisions establishing government
and distributing competences. 180 While both components are
interrelated, the distinction between individual rights and structural
provisions is of some significance. The constitutional law of modern
states usually encompasses general rules—whether explicit in the
Constitution or developed in constitutional doctrine—that apply to all
individual rights. These general rules regulate, for example, who is
the bearer of the rights, who is bound by those rights, what constitutes
176. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 215–30 (1998).
177. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433–436 (Joseph Gales, Sr., ed., 1834) reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 12–13.
178. See Goldwin, supra note 128, at 62 (“If the House of Representatives had gone along
with Madison’s proposal to insert the new articles in the body of the Constitution, it would have
been difficult to think of them collectively as a body to be called the Bill of Rights, or any other
collective name.”); see also Kenneth R. Bowling, “A Tub to the Whale”: The Adoption of the
Bill of Rights, reprinted in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES 46, 53 (Patrick T. Conley &
John P. Kaminski eds., 1992); Marshall, supra note 8, at 113; AMAR, supra note 176, at 291–
92.
179. Amar, supra note 154, at 694.
180. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutions and Judicial Power, reprinted in
COMPARATIVE POLITICS 217, 219 (Daniele Caramania ed., 2008).
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an infringement, and whether and how such an infringement can be
justified.
In American constitutional law, such general terms that would
apply to all fundamental rights similarly have only partially developed.
Fundamental rights doctrine has evolved independently for each right.
For instance, First Amendment doctrine bears only little resemblance
to the doctrine of the Fourth Amendment, or of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. However, there are some general
rules that apply in a similar way to all fundamental rights guarantees.
The state action doctrine generally applies to all fundamental rights,
and within the discussion of the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny,
constitutional rights are put into relation to each other. The bundling
of the rights made these developments easier, thus, laying open the
shared nature of the rights embodied in the Bill of Rights.
This coherence of individual rights doctrine is best exhibited in the
discussion of whether the Bill of Rights applies to the states. In 1833,
when the Supreme Court held in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore that
the rights embodied in the amendments apply only to the federal
government and not to the states, Chief Justice Marshall did not
regard the different wording of the amendments as significant.181 The
First Amendment explicitly applies only to Congress while the Fifth
Amendment, which was discussed in Barron, does not encompass any
such restriction. Nevertheless, Marshall did not have difficulties
applying the same standards to all parts of the Bill of Rights alike,
limiting their scope of application to actions taken by the federal
government. 182 Subsequently, the Supreme Court explicitly and
generally held that the Bill of Rights was intended to protect against
the federal government and not against the states.183
Similarly, when the discussion started of whether the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated fundamental rights guarantees, it was
primarily focused on the Bill of Rights as a whole. Congressmen John
Bingham and Jacob Howard both expressed the opinion that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated all the guarantees encompassed
by the Bill of Rights, 184 and so did Justice Hugo Black. 185
181. Barron v. Mayor of Balt. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) (“These amendments
contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the state governments. This court
cannot so apply them.”).
182. See id.
183. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51 (1947) overruled by McDonald v. Chicago,
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
184. See AMAR, supra note 2, at 387–88 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
2765–66 (1866)).
185. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 90 (Black, J., dissenting); Duncan v. Louisiana 391 U.S. 145,
162–63 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
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Subsequently, the Supreme Court did not incorporate the Bill of
Rights as a whole; rather, it incorporated specific rights encompassed
by the first eight amendments. 186 This selective approach is
understandable against the background of the case or controversy
clause. 187 The broader debate, however, focused on the question of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the whole Bill of
Rights or only some parts of it. 188 The bundling of fundamental rights
in the first eight amendments intuitively raises the question why only
some and not all parts of the Bill of Rights should be incorporated. It
is furthermore remarkable that the incorporation discussion
concentrated solely on the Bill of Rights and did not encompass other
individual rights guarantees that are spread throughout the seven
articles of the original Constitution. 189
It seems possible, and indeed very likely, that the bundling of
rights in the Bill of Rights contributed to forming the debate and
directing the focus on the first eight amendments. Had these
amendments been interwoven with the original Constitution in the way
Madison envisioned, the debate could have gone a different way. The
provisions encompassed now by the Bill of Rights would not as easily
be regarded as building a normative unity. It would not be as
intuitively logical to apply the same standards generally to all of the
rights. It would not have been as easy and convincing for proponents
of total incorporation to argue that the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated all the guarantees that were adopted at the First
Congress. In fact, it would have been more difficult to argue in favor
of incorporation at all, had the Fourteenth Amendment been
interwoven in the original Constitution. 190
While the unification of the first ten amendments in the Bill of

186. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (incorporating the First
Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(incorporating the Fourth Amendment’s right against unreasonable search and seizure); Klopfer
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment’s right to a speedy
trial); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment’s
protection against double jeopardy). For a more comprehensive list, see CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 173, at 503–504.
187. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
188. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 173, at 500–03.
189. In Torcaso v. Watkins the Supreme Court held that Maryland’s requirement of a
declaration of a belief in God for taking public office violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Only in a footnote did Justice Black address the question of whether Article VI, §
3 of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States,” was violated. However,
since the Court reversed the judgment on other grounds he found it unnecessary to examine
whether this provision also applied to the states. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489 n.1
(1961).
190. See Marshall, supra note 8, at 112–13.
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Rights might therefore have facilitated at least a certain degree of
coherence among the enumerated rights, it might at the same time
have contributed to a distortion of the relationship between the original
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. As has already been pointed out,
the focus on the Bill of Rights has led to a certain neglect of the
individual rights enshrined in the original Constitution. 191 The
supplementary model of constitutional amendment might also have
contributed to an excessively dichotomic understanding of the original
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. While the former is deemed to be
concerned mainly with structural issues of the establishment and
organization of government, the latter is regarded as endowing
individuals with rights against encroachment by the majority.192 This
view is not incorrect but it is too simplistic. It tends to overlook that
the Bill of Rights is deeply intertwined with structural questions of
government and does not only employ minority rights but also, more
generally, rights that are supposed to guard society against a
government that does not act in the general interest. 193 Sherman’s
approach to constitutional amendment allowed for the development of
an understanding of the Bill of Rights as an inclusive normative
system—a constitution besides the Constitution. While this might have
strengthened the internal coherence of the application and
interpretation of the specific rights, it also contributed to a one-sided
and biased approach to the Bill of Rights as being concerned only
with—allegedly countermajoritarian—individual rights guarantees.

D. Constitutional Interpretation
Until now this article has tried to show what impact the decision
of the First Congress to attach amendments to the original Constitution
supposedly had on subsequent constitutional developments in a broad,
conceptual perspective. Turning to more doctrinal issues, the question
arises whether the model of amendment had and has an impact on
constitutional interpretation. In other words: would the prevailing
interpretation of the twenty-seven amendments to the Constitution have
been different had they not been appended but integrated into the text
of the original Constitution?

191. Id.
192. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 173, at 1-5.
193. Amar, supra note 124, at 1131.
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1. The relevance of location
The perennial debate about the right or appropriate way to
interpret the Constitution—most prominently carried out between
“originalists” and “living constitutionalists”—is well-known.
Notwithstanding this debate and its jurisprudential underpinnings194,
constitutional practice exhibits the constant usage of certain types of
argumentation. Philip Bobbitt has identified the prevailing interpretive
modalities as historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and
ethical. 195 At the first view, it does not seem to make a difference
whether the amendments are adhered to or integrated in the original
Constitution: the historical background will be the same, the text will
be identical—or at least it can be identical—doctrinal, prudential, and
ethical considerations will not be different, and even the structure of
the Constitution will hardly be affected. However, a constitutional
provision cannot only be read in clause-bound isolation, as in classical
textual analysis, and also not only from the broad perspective of
constitutional structure. Situated somewhat in-between the micro and
the macro perspective applied by those two interpretive modalities are
systematic modes of interpretation that focus on the text of a certain
clause or phrase, but derive constitutional meaning from an analysis of
its relationship with other clauses of the Constitution; this mode of
interpretation has been called “locational textualism,” or
“architextur[alism]” 196 or “architectural.” 197
The use of this interpretive method is best displayed in the two
landmark decisions of Marbury v. Madison 198 and McCulloch v.
Maryland. 199 In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall ruled
that, although the Court could not issue a mandamus due to
jurisdictional reasons, Marbury had a right to his commission as
justice of the peace. 200 Marshall argued that Marbury was already
appointed, and that the delivery of the commission was not a
constitutive part of the appointment process.201 In order to arrive at
this conclusion, Marshall referred to the location of the appointing
194. See, e.g., SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 24–28, on
file with the author).
195. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 3–119 (1982). For a more recent
comprehensive study, see LACKHAND H. BLOOM, JR., METHODS OF INTERPRETATION: HOW THE
SUPREME COURT READS THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
196. Amar, supra note 154, at 672, 696.
197. BLOOM, JR., supra note 195, at 44.
198. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
199. M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
200. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 162.
201. Id. at 159–162.
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power and the power to grant commissions, reasoning that “[t]he acts
of appointing to office, and commissioning the person appointed, can
scarcely be considered as one and the same; since the power to
perform them is given in two separate and distinct sections of the
constitution.” 202
In McCulloch, Marshall was faced with the question of whether
Congress had the power to establish a national bank. 203 Marshall
concluded that the Necessary and Proper Clause 204 empowered
Congress and did not limit its competences. 205 He derived this reading
from the location of the Necessary and Proper Clause, which is based
in Section 8 of Article I and deals with the powers of Congress rather
than the limitations of Congress laid down in Section 9.206
In light of this mode of argumentation—which, of course, is not
alone decisive and can be trumped by other argumentative
modalities 207—the decision to adhere the amendments and to not
integrate them into the original text can have an influence on
constitutional interpretation. In the following, I will demonstrate this
influence with the help of a few examples.

2. Clarifying the scope of application of the Bill of Rights
If Madison had prevailed, today’s First Amendment would have
been integrated in Article I, Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution among
the other limitations of Congress’s powers. 208 This would have made
the contemporary and rather extensive interpretation of the First
Amendment more difficult. Although the First Amendment textually
applies only to Congress 209—and through incorporation via the
Fourteenth Amendment to the state legislatures—the Supreme Court
has not applied the First Amendment solely to the legislative branch.
The Court has declared unconstitutional not only federal and state
laws, but also the posting of the Ten Commandments to a courthouse
in two Kentucky counties, 210 state university policies excluding
religious student groups from the use of university facilities that were

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 156.
M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 401.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18.
M’Culloch, 17 U.S. at 418–419.
Id. at 419.
See Amar, supra note 154, at 698; BLOOM, JR., supra note 195, at 44–45.
See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433–436 (Joseph Gales, Sr., ed., 1834), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 12; Hartnett, supra note 8, at 289.
209. “Congress shall make no law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
210. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
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generally available for activities of student groups, 211 and a state
agency’s refusal to allow the Ku Klux Klan to build a large Latin
cross in a park next to the state capitol. 212 This extensive interpretation
of the First Amendment conflicts with the text of the provision. In
order to apply the guarantees enshrined in the First Amendment not
only to the legislature but also to other branches of government, and
not only to laws but also to simple acts and administrative decisions,
the Court had to overcome the textual command. Had Madison
prevailed and had the provision we know today as the First
Amendment been integrated in Article I, Section 9, the argumentative
burden for the Court would have been even heavier. The Court would
not only have to ignore the explicit textual content but also the
location of the provision that would have clearly indicated that
religious and communicative freedoms were deemed to apply against
legislative acts. And the Supreme Court’s decisions in Marbury and
McCulloch show that the Court takes this locational argument
seriously. This is not to say that the Court would not have extended
the scope of the First Amendment in a similar way, as it actually did,
had the text of the amendment been integrated in Article I, Section 9.
However, the Court would have faced an additional argument against
such a broad reading, and critics of the Court would have had an
additional point of attack against the Court’s jurisprudence.
Similar observations apply to other parts of the Bill of Rights. The
Fourth Amendment, for example, undoubtedly provides a
constitutional protection directly against unreasonable searches and
seizures by the police. 213 Unlike the First Amendment, it does not
encompass a textual limitation to actions by Congress. However, had
the text of the Fourth Amendment been integrated into Article I,
Section 9 of the U.S. Constitution as Madison proposed, 214 the
understanding of the Fourth Amendment as a protection directed
against police action would be at least more complicated.
Constitutional interpretation would be faced with the problem of
applying a provision in Article I, Section 9 that deals with limits on
the powers of Congress to executive action.
From the perspective of eighteenth century constitutionalism, the
focus on Congress is understandable. It seems that the Founders’ main
concern in limiting the powers of the national government and thereby
preventing abuse of power was directed at Congress. Hamilton
211.
212.
213.
214.

Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433–436 (Joseph Gales, Sr., ed., 1834), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 12–13.
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characterized the judiciary as the least dangerous branch,215 and in the
Founding vision the office of the Presidency was expected to be
carried out with “Republican virtue.” 216 Moreover, while the idea of
the separation of powers was at the core of the Founders’
constitutional conception, it appears they regarded most governmental
activities to be dependent on Congress. For example, Congress was
supposed to make the laws that the executive carried out and the
courts interpreted and applied. From that perspective, constitutional
restraints on Congress could be understood as constitutional restraints
on all branches of government in general. 217
In contemporary constitutional thought, by contrast, all three
branches of government are directly subject to the constitutional
limitations of fundamental rights guarantees. The peacetime quartering
of soldiers without the consent of the house owner violates the Third
Amendment 218 whether it is ordered by a congressional statute,
directly by the President, or based upon a court decision. Had the first
amendments been integrated in Article I, Section 9 and Article III,
Section 2, respectively, the prohibition of non-consensual peacetime
quartering could, of course, also have been extended to all three
branches of government. But this extensive reading would have had to
overcome the argumentative obstacle of applying fundamental rights
guarantees to all branches of government although their location in the
text of the Constitution would indicate that their scope of application
should be limited to one.

3. Avoiding ambiguities between the amendments and the original
Constitution
When Madison wrote to White in August 1789 and reported that
Sherman had prevailed in changing the form of the amendments, he
voiced the concern that:
[I]t is already apparent I think that some ambiguities will be
produced by this change, as the question will often arise and
sometimes be not easily solved, how far the original text is or is not
219
necessarily superseded, by the supplemental act.

215. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 522–23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
216. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 67–68.
217. ANASTAPLO, supra note 7, at 49.
218. U.S. CONST. amend. III.
219. Letter from James Madison to Alexander White (Aug. 24, 1789), reprinted in
CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 287–88.
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This problem foreseen by Madison arose, for example, with regard to
the question of whether and how far the Fifth and the Sixth
Amendments affect the content of Article III of the Constitution. In
Patton v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the guarantee of
jury trial in criminal cases in Article III, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the
Constitution and in the Sixth Amendment constitutes primarily a right
of the defendant and can therefore be waived.220 The Court drew upon
the history of Article III and the framers’ intent, but also referred to
the text of the Sixth Amendment that clearly depicts jury trial as a
right of the accused. 221 However, if regarded in isolation, the jury
clause in Article III is more convincingly understood as putting an
objective obligation on the government.222 Due to the coexistence of
the Amendment and Article III, the Court could refer to the Sixth
Amendment as an additional factor in favor of its reading of Article
III. Regardless of whether one agrees with the holding of the Court in
Patton, the opinion shows how the supplementary form of the
amendments can lead to more ambiguity and thereby increase the
argumentative options for constitutional interpretation. Had the Court
wanted to reach the opposite result, it could have put more emphasis
on the text of Article III and argued that the First Congress did not
intend to alter the meaning of Article III through the Sixth
Amendment. Under the Madisonian model, this ambiguity would cease
to exist: the Sixth Amendment would have been split up, with the
more detailed regulation about the criminal trial jury in Article III,
and with other rights of the accused in criminal proceedings inserted
in Article I, Section 9. 223 Madison’s approach would have forced the
framers to decide on less ambiguous language. There would have been
no potentially waiveable “right” to trial by jury in the text of the
Constitution but only the more objectively formulated obligation that
the trial of all crimes “shall be by an impartial jury.” 224

220. Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 297–98 (1930).
221. Id. at 298; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
222. Amar, supra note 124, at 1196–97.
223. Hartnett, supra note 8, at 260–61; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433–436 (Joseph Gales, Sr.,
ed., 1834), reprinted in CREATING THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 12–13.
224. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433–436 (Joseph Gales, Sr., ed., 1834), reprinted in CREATING
THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 12–13.
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4. Clarifying the scope of enforcement powers under the
Reconstruction Amendments
The Reconstruction Amendments do not only extend the concept
of citizenship and encompass prohibitions on the federal government
and the state with regard to race discrimination. They also empower
Congress to enforce the provisions of the three Amendments through
appropriate legislation. 225 However, in 1883 the Supreme Court held
in the Civil Rights Cases that Congress had no authority to enact laws
against private discrimination under the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendment. 226 While the Court has overruled this restrictive approach
with regard to the enforcement power under the Thirteenth
Amendment, 227 it reaffirmed its position with regard to the Fourteenth
Amendment as recently as in the 2000 decision of United States v.
Morrison. 228 The reasoning underlying the Civil Rights Cases and
Morrison reflects a holistic view of the Fourteenth Amendment. Just
like Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is only addressed to state
action, Section 5 authorizes Congress only to regulate discrimination
by the states and not private behavior. This view is expressed by
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Morrison:
Foremost among these limitations is the time-honored principle that
the Fourteenth Amendment, by its very terms, prohibits only state
action. “[T]he principle has become firmly embedded in our
constitutional law that the action inhibited by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to
be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against
229
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”

Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole does not apply to
private action. 230 The Court employs a similarly holistic approach with
regard to the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. While
the Court held in Katzenbach v. Morgan that the Fourteenth
Amendment vested broad powers in Congress comparable to the
Necessary and Proper Clause, 231 it retreated from this approach in
225. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2, amend. XIV, § 5, amend. XV, § 2.
226. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
227. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160 (1976); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
228. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
229. Id. at 621 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
230. For a different reading of the Fourteenth Amendment, see AMAR, supra note 2, at
382–83.
231. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966).
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City of Boerne v. Flores, and emphasized that Section 5 authorized
Congress only to enact “remedial” legislation.232 It explicitly rejected
the view that Section 5 allowed Congress to expand the scope of the
rights contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.233 The
scope of Congress’s powers under Section 5 therefore only extends as
far as the prohibition under Section 1 reaches. The Supreme Court has
confirmed this approach in subsequent decisions. 234
The approach of the Supreme Court under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment has been subject to harsh criticism, and
compelling arguments can be relied on in favor of a more extensive
approach. 235 The location of Section 5, however, supports the Court’s
restrictive reading. The placement of Section 5 next to Section 1
within the same Amendment suggests a common understanding of the
scope of the two provisions, with Congress’s power under Section 5
reaching only as far as the prohibition under Section 1. The same
holds true for the Court’s holding that Section 5 does not encompass
the regulation of private conduct. If private conduct is not prohibited
under Section 1, it seems intelligible and coherent that Congress
cannot regulate it under Section 5.
This locational argument would fall away under Madison’s
approach to the amendment technique. Although we can only assume
how the Reconstruction Congress would have integrated the substance
of the Amendments into the text of the Constitution, it presumably
would have split up the Amendments, placed the prohibitory elements
at different places in the Constitution, and integrated the enforcement
powers into Article I, Section 8. Edward Hartnett has suggested that
the substance of Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment would
probably have been added to the Necessary and Proper Clause,
clarifying that Congress had the authority to “enforce the limitations
and obligations imposed by this Constitution,” thereby also
encompassing the enforcement power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 236 Regardless of whether Congress would
have chosen exactly this approach, the clearer separation of limits on
Congress and government in general on the one side, and powers of
Congress on the other, would have allowed for a broader
understanding of Congressional powers after Reconstruction. It would
232. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
233. Id. at 527–28.
234. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001).
235. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the
People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003).
236. Hartnett, supra note 8, at 269, 275–76.
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have been easier to maintain and elaborate the broad approach taken
by the Court in Katzenbach. The enforcement powers would be read
rather in their context with other broad powers of Congress under the
Necessary and Proper Clause or the Commerce Clause, and not so
much within their relationship with the prohibitory elements of today’s
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.

E. Constitutional Moments and Intergenerational Synthesis
The foregoing examples have shown how individual amendments
have to be brought into accordance with individual provisions of the
original Constitution. This touches upon a more general phenomenon
of constitutional development. Significant constitutional developments
can raise the question of whether they not only influence single
provisions of the original Constitution, but demand a more
fundamental, conceptual change in the understanding and interpretation
of the Constitution. This question has most prominently been attacked
by Bruce Ackerman. 237 According to Ackerman, the history of the
American Republic is characterized by distinctive constitutional
moments of higher lawmaking. 238 He identifies the Founding,
Reconstruction, and the New Deal as the “three great turning points of
constitutional history.” 239 These three moments of higher lawmaking
are characterized by significant normative transformations brought
along by the people who in a five-step process—consisting of
signaling, proposal, deliberation, ratification, and consolidation—
engage in higher lawmaking. 240 These normative transformations can
come along as formal amendments, such as the Reconstruction
Amendments, 241 or they can take shape in form of important judicial
decisions (“landmark cases”) and statutes (“superstatutes”).242 This
division of constitutional history into constitutional moments entails
the necessity of intergenerational synthesis. 243 According to
Ackerman, transformative amendments—regardless of whether they

237. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5; ACKERMAN, supra note 3. For a summary of
Ackerman’s theory, see Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 11
CONST. COMMENT. 115, 116–22 (1994).
238. ACKERMAN, supra note 5.
239. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 58.
240. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 266–94.
241. Note, however, that according to Ackerman the Reconstruction Amendments did not
come into force in the way envisioned by Article V but nevertheless were a legitimate exercise in
higher lawmaking by the people. See ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 99–119, 207–34; for a critical
appraisal, see AMAR, supra note 2, at 364–80.
242. Ackerman counterplea, supra note 3, at 1741–42.
243. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 86–99, 131–62.

87]

CONSTITUTIONAL AESTHETICS

129

come along in the formal way of Article V amendments or not—have
to be integrated into the original Constitution not only with regard to
the specific provisions they might affect, but also on a higher level of
generality; this task of synthesizing the different constitutional regimes
is carried out by the judiciary in particular. 244 It is for the courts to
reconcile the diverse paradigms dominating the three constitutional
moments: the Founding’s concern with individual rights and limited
national government, the implications of Reconstruction for equal
protection of the races and arguably other minorities and social
groups, and the New Deal’s affirmation and legitimization of activist
government and of regulatory interference in economic and social
life. 245
Ackerman thereby invites us to understand constitutional
development not as a steady flow of events, but rather as a process of
normal politics that is at times disrupted by constitutional revolutions
of a transformative nature in which the people engage in higher
lawmaking. 246 It has been pointed out that the technique of adhering
amendments to the Constitution highlights and facilitates the issue of
intergenerational synthesis. 247 And indeed, as Ackerman himself
stipulates, had the Reconstruction Republicans not limited themselves
to the three amendments, but proposed a completely new Constitution,
the issue of synthesis would not have arisen. 248
The supplementary form of the amendments certainly makes it
easier to see the synthesis problem. However, substantively the same
problem would arise had the amendments been integrated into the text.
Furthermore, not all amendments take part in the intergenerational
synthesis of Ackerman’s theory. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment, for
example, is characterized as a mere “superstatute” and not as a
transformative amendment. 249 It changes only the voting age and not
any deeper principles underlying the Constitution.250 On the other
hand, Ackerman does not only include formal amendments in the
process of synthesis, but also—as in the New Deal—constitutional
principles that are expressed in other ways, such as landmark
decisions or superstatutes. 251 Under the theory of constitutional
moments and intergenerational synthesis, the transformative content

244.
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ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 58–80.
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that has to be synthesized with the traditional principles of the
preceding constitutional regimes has to be identified, regardless of
whether it comes along in the form of an amendment or an unwritten
transformation.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The supplementary form of the amendments to the U.S.
Constitution is a peculiarity that is hardly recognized as such by
scholars and students. An inquiry into the background of the First
Congress’s choice in favor of this mode of amendment reveals the
somewhat arbitrary and misguided character of the decision.
Constitutional scholars seldom pay attention to this historical fact
although it arguably had some impact on subsequent constitutional
developments. It influenced the practice of constitutional amendments
as well as our understanding of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.
It also has some subtle but relevant implications for the interpretation
of the amendments and their relationship with the original
Constitution.
Constitutional scholars who deal with the amendment form
regularly also evaluate the First Congress’s decision in favor of
Sherman’s approach. While some have argued that Madison’s proposal
would have resulted in a better Bill of Rights and avoided some
interpretive ambiguities, 252 others highlight the merits of Sherman’s
approach. 253 Regardless of these different assessments, the somewhat
idiosyncratic style of constitutional amendment is part and parcel of
American constitutionalism. The purpose of this article is to contribute
to the understanding of this design choice and of its implications for
past and future constitutional developments.

252. Hartnett, supra note 8, at 262; Marshall, supra note 8, at 114–15.
253. AMAR, supra note 2, at 458–62.

